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11 Introduction
There is a growing theoretical debate about the eects of product market competition
on managerial eort and rm owners' use of incentive schemes. While the earlier liter-
ature speculates that insucient competition leads to managerial slack,1 Hart (1983)
was one of the rst to formalize the idea that competition reduces managerial slack.2
However, subsequent research showed that the relationship between competition and
managerial slack becomes ambiguous as soon as Hart's assumption of innitely risk
averse managers is abandoned (Scharfstein, 1998).3
While most of the papers focus on the information eects of competition (i.e. the
idea that competition helps a principal to make better inferences about his agent's
actions), Schmidt (1997) investigates the interactions between product market compe-
tition and incentives of managers without relying on such information eects. In his
setup, increased competition reduces the rm's prot, which induces the manager to
work harder for a cost reduction in order to avoid liquidation. However, the reduction
in prots also aects the protability of a cost reduction, which may have an ambiguous
eect on manager's work eort.
As for the eect of competition on managerial eort and executive compensation,
Schmidt (1997) is in line with other papers by showing that this relationship is am-
biguous and depends on dierent eects. However, in contrast to previous research,
Schmidt (1997) shows that the outside options of the managers play a crucial role in
determining the sign of the total eect. Specically, if the market for managers is
1According to Leibenstein (1966), there may be a substantial amount of X-ineciency if output
markets are imperfectly competitive. Also, he argues that that this type of ineciency is much more
important in practice than more conventional sorts of ineciencies due to prices not being equal to
marginal costs. Machlup (1967) notes that managerial slack as an ineciency source does not exist
if a rm operates in a perfectly competitive environment. However, Jensen and Meckling (1976)
claim that a monopolist has the same incentives to reduce agency costs than an owner of a perfectly
competitive rm.
2He develops a model of the relationship between competition and slack in a situation where
ineciency is explicitly the result of a con
ict of interest between owners and managers. Since rm
owners cannot monitor managerial actions and are also uncertain about their costs, they do not know
whether a bad performance of the rm is due to mismanagement or high costs. Given the fact that
the rms' costs are positively correlated, lower costs lead to lower prices. It follows that managers
who must fulll prot targets will have less opportunity to engage in managerial slack than if their
costs alone had fallen without a change in the output prices.
3Hermalin (1992) considers two other eects, competition might have on a rm's agency problem,
namely the risk-adjustment eect and the change-in-relative-value-of-action eect. Overall, Hermalin
(1992) nds that each of these eects is of potentially ambiguous sign. He concludes that theory does
not oer a denitive defense of the presumption that increased competition reduces managerial slack.
2tough, an increase in competition is less likely to result in stronger incentive schemes
than if the market for managers is soft. This feature of the model allows us to em-
pirically discriminate these dierent cases, which makes it attractive for an empirical
test.
The aim of our paper is to empirically investigate the eect of competition on exec-
utive compensation. Besides looking at the level of compensation, we for the rst time
consider various measures which characterize the structure of executive compensation
and which give a more complete picture of the incentives the executives are facing.4 In
addition, we explicitly take into account whether the bargaining power of the managers
aects the relationship between competition and executive compensation, as predicted
by Schmidt's (1997) model.
The data set is a panel for rms in the US manufacturing industries over the years
1992 to 2000. While data on executive compensation and rm characteristics are taken
from the Compustat Executive database and Compustat Industrial Annual database,
we rst have to build measures for the intensity of competition.
For each sub-industry in the industries 32 and 33 (NAICS 3 digit-level), we esti-
mate an intensity of competition measure as suggested by Boone and Weigand (2000).
The advantage of the Boone-Weigand Indicator, compared to traditional competition
measures (e.g. concentration ratio, industry protability) is that it not only captures
competition going together with more rms in the market, but also competition re-
sulting from more aggressive behavior of the rms in the industry.5 However, we also
employ the price-cost margin as an alternative measure of competition.
Using these two measures of competition, we nd the following relationship between
competition and executive compensation: The relationship between competition and
4There are a two related papers, which focus on the strategic eect of compensation schemes. Ag-
garwal and Samwick (1999), for instance, test for the eects of competition on relative performance
evaluation in executive compensation contracts. As such, the focus is on the joint impact of competi-
tion and (own- and rival-rm) performance on compensation; in contrast, the eect of competition on
the level and structure of compensation can hardly be tested, since there is no variation of the com-
petition measure over time (Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) use the Herndahl-Index in the dierent
industries for the year 1992). Kedia (1998), on the other hand, investigates how rms use incentive
contracts in order to alter product market behavior. Therefore, the analysis focuses on the eect
of compensation contracts on competition and not, as in our analysis, on the eects of a changing
intensity of competition on the level and structure of compensation.
5The basic idea is to empirically estimate how changes in eciency (relative costs) are re
ected
in changed prots. For instance, if competition in an industry is low, an increase in costs may not
reduce prots, whereas the opposite holds true under tough competition.
3executive compensation diers between the industries. In industry 32, an increase in
the intensity of competition led to a decrease in compensation as well as to the use of
weaker incentive schemes. In contrast, the opposite was observed in industry 33. For
both industries, however, we nd that with increasing outside options of the managers
(measured by the growth rate of the Dow Jones Index and a measure of the CEO's
past performance), an increase in competition led to higher executive compensation
(especially in the variable part of the salary).
Therefore, our results are consistent with the literature which posits an ambigu-
ous relationship between competition and executive compensation, but predicts that
increasing outside options of the managers positively aect this relationship.
The main innovations of the paper can be summarized as follows. It is the rst paper
which empirically investigates the relationship between executive compensation and
product market competition while explicitly taking into account the outside option of
managers. In addition, we use a new concept to measure the intensity of product market
competition which overcomes the ambiguity problems of the conventional competition
measures.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 contains Schmidt's (1997)
theoretical model and our derivation of a testable hypothesis. Section 3 describes
the concepts to measure the intensity of competition on product markets and shows
the estimates for the dierent sub-industries. The econometric model, which relates
competition to executive compensation, is presented in section 4, and section 5 contains
the results. Section 6 concludes. Some supplementary materials can be found in the
appendix.
2 The model
Subsections 2.1. to 2.2. outline the theoretical model which goes back to Schmidt
(1997). As is described in section 2.3., we use Schmidt's model in order to derive a
testable hypothesis for the empirical section of the paper. The reader familiar with
Schmidt's model can skip the rst two subsections and directly go to subsection 2.3,
where the eect of competition on the compensation contract is derived or subsection
2.4, where the results are summarized and the testable hypothesis is outlined.
42.1 The basic setup
Schmidt (1997) considers the following model: At date t = 0, the owner of the rm
hires a manager for the CEO position on a competitive market for identical managers.
The owner of the rm and the manager are risk neutral. The manager's job is to
improve the eciency of the rm by reducing the future production costs. The cost




and cH > cL: Initially,
the rm is characterized by a high cost parameter cH: At date t = 1; the manager
chooses his eort level. The probability that the manager's activities lead to a cost
reduction is a function of his eort, i.e., by exerting eort, the manager increases the
probability p that a cost reduction takes place and that the technology switches to
the low cost parameter cL: The eort of the manager is unobservable. The manager
chooses p; with p 2 [0;1]; at personal costs G(p) which increase with p at an increasing
rate, i.e., G0(p) > 0;G00(p) > 0 with G(0) = G0(0) and limp!1 G(p) = 1:
At date t = 2; the realization of c becomes publicly observable. The owner of the
rm then decides whether to stay in the market and to compete with its rivals, or
to exit the market and liquidate the rm. In the latter case, the liquidation value of
the rm is normalized to zero. At date t = 3; in case the rm still is in the market,
production takes place and prots  are realized.
Figure 1 resumes the structure of the game.
Figure 1: Structure of the game
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5As for the third stage of the game, Schmidt (1997) does not explicitly model the
market game, but assumes that it has a unique equilibrium and that the reduced-form
gross prot function is given by
 = (c;;") (1)
where  measures the degree of product market competition in the market and "
is an exogenous noise variable. The degree of product market competition , with
 2  2 R; is a continuous variable which can re
ect the number of competitors
in the market, whether the rms compete in prices or in quantities, the degree of
product dierentiation or any other indicator of the intensity of competition. The
exogenous noise variable "; with " 2 R; is distributed according to the cumulative
distribution function F(") and may re
ect how many rms in the market have been
successful in reducing their costs, or some exogenous technological or demand shocks.
Its realization is publicly observable at date t = 2, i.e. after the manager has chosen his
eort level and before the owner decides on liquidation of the rm. The reduced-form
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Equation (2) says that if the manager is successful in reducing the costs, the rm's
prot increases. Equation (3) states that prots are always non-negative in case the
manager was successful, independently of the degree of competition. Finally, equation
(4) denes the meaning of more competition, i.e., when competition increases, the
prots decrease.
Given this structure of the game and the prot function (1) with properties (2)-(4),
we now can describe the payo functions for the owner and the manager and derive
the owner's optimization problem.
6The payo of the rm owner Up is given by
U
p = maxf0;(c;;")   wg (5)
where w is the wage payment to the manager. Given that the owner is risk neutral, he
can always close down the rm and realize a payo of zero.
The manager's payo is given by
U
m = f
w   G(p) if the rm stays in the market
w   G(p)   Lm if the rm is liquidated (6)
Lm represents the utility loss of the manager in case the rm is liquidated. It may
represent the search costs to look for a new job, the loss of human capital or a negative
reputation eect which lowers his future income.
Given that the manager's eort is not observable, it cannot be contracted on. By the
revelation principle, we can restrict our attention to contracts of the form fwL;wHg;
where wj is the wage payment to the manager if the cost realization of his rm is
cj;j 2 fL;Hg: With j denoting the expected gross prot of the rm,6 the principal's
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j  0; j 2 fL;Hg (10)
(8) represents the incentive compatibility constraint, with l() denoting the probability
the manager assigns at date t = 1 to the event that his rm will be liquidated at t = 2
6The expected gross prot of the rm for a given level of intensity of competition  and the
realization of the cost parameter cj is given by:
j() =
R
" maxf0;(cj;;")gdF("); j 2 fL;Hg
7(conditional on the cost parameter being cj). The incentive compatibility constraint
(8) guarantees that it is optimal for the manager to choose p0 = p. We assume that
the principal wants to implement a positive p; otherwise, he did not have to hire a
manager in the rst place. Accordingly, the manager's payo is strictly concave in p
for any fwL;wHg: If the eort choice problem has an interior solution, constraint (8)





0(p) = 0 (11)
The participation constraint (9) makes sure that the manager's expected utility from
working for the company is at least as high as his outside option given by U
m  0: The
wealth constraint (10) states that the payment to the manager has to be non-negative
in both states of the world. It rules out, for instance, that the rm can be sold to the
manager.
The following assumption, which is imposed by G000(p)  0; guarantees that the
principal's optimization problem is globally concave and has a unique solution:
2G
00(p) + pG
000(p) > 0; 8p 2 [0;1] (12)
In addition, it is assumed that the manager cannot pay for the company ex post in
neither state of the world. Despite the wealth constraint, he could do so if Hwere
larger than the expected surplus generated by the rst best level of eort pFB: In this
case it would be optimal to sell the company to the manager for a lump-sum payment
amounting to the expected social surplus generated by the rst best solution pFB : (13)
guarantees that the manager's cost to work for the rm and to choose pFB is smaller
than the expected increase in prots, i.e.,
U
m + G(p






2.2 The optimal contract
Schmidt (1997) shows in proposition 1 of his paper7 that the unique optimal contract
solving the second-best problem implements pSB = maxfp;pg; where pSB is charac-












0(p)   G(p) = lL
m + U
m (15)
(14) denotes the case when the participation constraint (9) is not binding (p > p),








H = 0 (17)
It can be shown that pSB = maxfp;pg < pFB:
The wage in the high costs state has to be zero to guarantee that the wealth
constraint (10) is binding. If it were not binding, i.e., wH > 0; the solution to the
second best problem should be the same as for the relaxed problem without (10).
By (13), however, the solution to the relaxed problem is selling the company to the
manager, i.e., wH < 0, so (10) is violated, which is a contradiction. The expression for
wL then follows directly from the incentive compatibility constraint (11).
In what follows, we measure the strength of incentives by the dierence between
the two wage levels (wL   wH):
2.3 The eects of competition on the strength of incentives
Based on Schmidt's (1997) model, we now derive the eect of an increase in competition














First, we need to understand how competition aects the manager's eort level,
i.e.,
dpSB()
d : There are two eects which play a role, one which Schmidt (1997) calls
9\threat of liquidation eect" (working through
dl()
d Lm), and another, which he calls
the \value-of-a-cost reduction eect" (working through [@L()=@   @H()=@]).
Let us rst describe the threat of liquidation eect. Given assumption (2), an
increase in the degree of competition reduces the prot in both states of the world.
Therefore, it increases the probability that the rm will be liquidated in the high cost
situation, i.e.
dl()
d  0, which would cause the manager a utility loss of Lm. This
increased probability of a utility loss (turnover costs etc.) gives the manager a direct
incentive to work harder. Also, by threat of liquidation, the owner's cost to implement
a higher level of eort may decrease as competition becomes more intense. The threat-
of-liquidation eect thus captures the common presumption that the manager works
harder if competition becomes more intense.
The second eect which has to be taken into account is the value-of-a-cost reduction
eect. From (14) we know that the optimal eort level p trades o the marginal
increase of total surplus given by (L H +lLm G0(p)) against the higher marginal
rent the rm owner has to pay to his manager, which is equal to (pG00(p)): The value-
of-a-cost reduction eect to the principal is given by (L H). Given that an increase
in  reduces both L and H; the sign of [@L()=@ @H()=@] is ambiguous. In








then the principal is less likely to oer a high rent to the manager, and he may want
to switch to a low-powered incentive scheme. In this case, an increase in competition
induces the manager to work less.
As Schmidt shows in Proposition 3 of his paper, the eect of a marginal increase
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] + (dl()=d)Lm
2G00(p) + pG000(p)
(20)







if (9) is binding.
After having understood how competition aects the manager's eort level, we can
now go back to (18) and rewrite it as follows: In case (9) is not binding, the eect of

















The second part of (22), which now captures the threat of liquidation eect, is always
negative since dl()=dLm > 0 and the term in brackets is negative due to G00(p) >
0; G000(p) > 0 and G00(p) < [2G00(p) + pG000(p)]: The sign of (22) now depends on
whether the value-of-a-cost reduction eect [@L()=@   @H()=@] is positive or
negative and on its relative size to the threat of liquidation eect as given by the second
term in (22). In case [@L()=@   @H()=@] > 0;we cannot determine the sign of
(22) since both terms go in opposite directions. If [@L()=@   @H()=@] < 0;
however, (22) is negative, i.e., an increase in the intensity of competition always lowers
the strength of incentives.
In case (9) is binding, (18) can be replaced by (23), and the eect of competition















Equation (23) is greater or equal to zero since dl()=dLm > 0 and [1=p   1]  0 due
to 0  p  1: In other words, more intense competition leads to stronger incentives for
managers.
Intuitively, these results can be explained as follows: stronger competition induces
the manager to work harder due to the higher threat of liquidation and the associ-
11ated turnover costs (as follows from the incentive compatibility constraint (8)). If his
bargaining power is strong (good outside options, participation constraint binding), he
can aord to demand a higher compensation for his increased eort level. On the other
hand, if the manager's bargaining power is weak (participation constraint not binding),
the owner can prot from the fact that the manager has an (intrinsic) incentive to work
harder and can therefore reduce the incentives. As such, an increase in competition
decreases incentives in this case - unless the value of an innovation increases strongly
with competition.8
2.4 Summary and testable hypothesis
We can resume the eects of an increase in the intensity of competition on the manager's
eort level and on the strength of incentives by the following table:
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% p & p & (wL   wH) & (wL   wH) & (wL   wH)
(PC)
binding % p - % (wL   wH) - % (wL   wH)
Since we cannot observe the eort level of the manager, we draw our attention to
the strength of incentives in order to derive a testable hypothesis from the model. In
case the participation constraint (9) is not binding, we do not know whether more
8Then, the owner has again an incentive to induce the manager to work harder by a higher com-
pensation in the case of success.
12competition leads to stronger or weaker incentives. It depends on the sign of the value-
of-a-cost reduction eect. In contrast, the model predicts an increase in the strength
of incentives (wL   wH) if (9) is binding (for an intuitive explanation of these eects,
see Section 2.3, last paragraph).
To empirically discriminate between these two situations, we can interpret the
meaning of the participation constraint as follows. If the participation constraint (9) is
binding, the manager is just indierent between his job and his outside option utility.
Therefore, he is in a situation of strong bargaining power. In the case where the partic-
ipation constraint is not binding, however, the manager gets an expected rent in excess
of his reservation utility. It is likely that there is an excess supply of managers and that
the manager's bargaining power is weak(er). Let us now formulate this hypothesis as
follows:
Hypothesis 1 If managers have good outside options (compared to when they have bad
outside options), an increase in the intensity of competition leads to stronger incentive
schemes for the manager and a higher compensation.9
Or, in mathematical terms:
@(wL wH)
@ (pc binding) 
@(wL wH)
@ (pc not binding)10
3 Measuring the intensity of Competition
Since we would like to empirically explore the relationship between product market
competition and executive compensation, we need an indicator for the degree of com-
petition in an industry.
9Since wH = 0 in the optimal contract, an increase in wL   wH not only signies an increase in
the relative, but also the absolute salary.
10As can be seen from Table 1 (or equations (22) and (23)), Hypothesis 1 always holds if
[@L()=@   @H()=@]  0, but does not necessarily hold if the value-of-cost reduction ef-
fect is positive ([@L()=@   @H()=@] > 0) and very large compared to the threat-of-
liquidation eect. However, as Schmidt (1997: 201) mentions, there are good reasons to believe
that [@L()=@ @H()=@]  0 holds, especially if competition is intense. In this case, the owner
can always liquidate the rm if expected prots are negative. This sets a lower bound for his prots
if costs are high which is not relevant in the low cost state. Furthermore, empirical studies suggest an
inverted U-shaped relationship between competition and the incentive to innovate; while the incentive
to innovate increases, when the market changes from monopoly to an oligopoly, it decreases again as
soon as more competitors enter the market and the market share declines (see Schmidt, 1997: 201).
As such, Hypothesis 1 is very plausible for markets with a minimal (initial) level of competition.
133.1 The Boone-Weigand indicator
There exists a large empirical literature on measuring the intensity of competition
in an industry. Common measures of competition include the concentration ratio of
an industry, industry prots, price-cost margins or import penetration. As Boone
and Weigand (2000) outline, these concentration measures only capture the notion of
increased competition if competition is intensied through a reduction of entry costs.
However, if competition increases as a result of more aggressive interaction between
rms, more competition can be consistent with increases as well as decreases of these
traditional measures.11
Boone and Weigand (2000) propose a competition indicator which is based on rel-
ative prots12 and which overcomes the ambiguity problem of the traditional competi-
tion measures. The basic idea is to relate eciency dierences between rms to prot
dierences. The more competitive an industry is, the more it raises the prots of an
ecient rm relative to the prot of a less ecient rm. As such, higher competition
(as implied by many models, see Boone and Weigand (2000)) goes together with higher
relative prots.13
The Boone-Weigand (BW) indicator always moves in the same direction as \com-
petition" itself. It captures the notion of a higher competition going together with
more rms in the market, but it also encompasses the case of increased competition
resulting from a more aggressive behavior of the rms in the industry. The relation








11Consider an industry where rms start to interact more aggressively with each other, because a
minimum price is abolished or because shop opening hours are liberalized for instance. It is likely
that the least ecient rms have to exit. As a result, we have a higher intensity of competition which
results in a higher concentration. As to industry prots, an increase in competition always reduces
the prots of the least ecient rms in the market, but it does not necessarily reduce each rm's
prot and it can even raise the prots of the most ecient rms. Therefore, more intense competition
lowers an industry's average prots only under certain conditions.
12Relative prots are dened as the prot of the ecient rm relative to the prot of an inecient
rm.
13An increase in competition can go together with higher or lower absolute prots of the ecient
rm. The important point to note is that when the prots of the ecient rm increases, the prots
of the inecient rm increases relatively less or decreases; and when the prots of the ecient rm
decreases, the prots of the inecient rm decreases even more.
14i = 1;:::;n; t = 1;:::;T
where it = (pit   cit)xit denes the prot of rm i; excluding possible xed costs,
producing output level xit at marginal cost cit and selling at price pit in period t in a
certain market or industry. t and ct;which are used to normalize rm i's prots and
marginal costs, stand for the prots and the marginal costs of the most ecient rm.
The coecient b measures the intensity of competition. It is typically negative
since rms with higher relative marginal costs have also relatively lower prots.14 As
competition increases, the slope b becomes larger in absolute value, i.e., in a more
competitive environment, a given eciency gain is better rewarded in the sense that
relative prots increase more.
A detailed description of the empirical implementation of the Boone-Weigand com-
petition indicator can be found in the appendix. As can be seen therefrom, the goal
would be to empirically estimate the b in equation (24) for each (3-digit) sub-industry
in the industries 32 and 33. However, the best feasible solution is to estimate the
elasticity of relative prots (relative to the industry median) to changes in relative av-
erage costs. Again, the more sensitive relative prots react to relative costs, the more
competitive an industry is assumed to be.
3.2 Industry price-cost margin
For comparison purposes, we use another year-specic competition measure, which is
based on the rms' price-cost margins as dened by (25) and is frequently used as a





We compute an industry-specic price-cost margin measure ind3 pcmjt, by taking
the median of the rm-specic price-cost margins pcmit in a given 3-digit sub-industry.
Figure 2 and 3 display the development of competition in industries 32 and 33.
As can be seen therefrom, competition measured by the Boone-Weigand-Indicator
14This hypothesis is supported by empirical evidence in Boone and Weigand (2000). It is also
consistent with the theoretical models which relate prots of a rm to its eciency.
15(Comp(BWI)) seems to move in the same direction as competition measured by the
Price-Cost-Margin (Comp(PCMarg)).15 Only for industry 326, we observe a remark-
able increase in the intensity of competition from 1992 to 1993 as measured by the
BWI, but not as measured by the Price-Cost-Margin. However, an increase in com-
petition from 1992 to 1993 is quite plausible, since the plastic and rubber products
manufacturing industry (NAICS 326, see Appendix) is highly dependent on sales to
the transport industries (road, air, rail and marine). Due to the rst Irak war in 1991
and the subsequent increase in oil prices, more aggressive interactions between the
rms might have resulted, which is re
ected in the BWI but not necessarily in the
Price-Cost-Margin. However, in the empirical part, we will check the robustness of the
results with respect to this potential outlier.
Although the Boone-Weigand-Indicator is theoretically superior to the Price-Cost-
Margin since it better captures the interaction between the rms, we have to bear in
mind that it has to be empirically estimated with imperfect data (proxies for marginal
costs etc.) We address this problem in the empirical part as follows: In a rst set of
estimations, we employ the Boone-Weigand-Indicator as a measure of competition. In
a second set, we model competition as a latent variable, with two indicators (Boone-
Weigand-Indicator, PC-Margin) thereof. Since the rst principal component explains
roughly 80 percent of the variation of the X-Matrix (BWI, PCMarg) for both indus-
tries (83 % in industry 32 and 79 % in industry 33), it seems to be a reasonable
approximation for the unobservable intensity of competition.
15Since a higher estimated Boone-Weigand-Indicator and a higher Price-Cost-Margin re
ect less
competition, we took the negative amount of these measures in order to get competition-indicators,
which increase in the intensity of competition.









































































1) The left vertical axis measures the intensity of 
competition as implied by the BWI and the right axis 
as implied by the PCMargin. Higher values reflect an 
increasing intensity of competition.
2) From the 7 3-digit subindustries in Industry 32
(321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327), there are 5 
subindustries (322, 324, 325, 326, 327) with enough 
data for estimating the Boone-Weigand-Indicator 
(i.e.> 30 observations, see Appendix).

















































































184 The Econometric Models
In the following, we will estimate two dierent models. While model 1 focuses on
the relationship between competition and executive compensation, model 2 captures
the interaction between competition and the manager's outside options in relation to
executive compensation.
4.1 Model 1: Relationship between Competition and Execu-
tive Compensation




where i denotes the rm, j the (3-digit-level) industry, rm i is in, and t stands for
the specic year (recall that we have panel data from 1992 to 2000).
Exe refers to rm i's executive compensation measures. We build ve measures to
describe the level and structure of executive compensation:
1. The xed level of compensation: salaryit stands for the xed salary, the CEO
receives.
2. The variable level of compensation: salaryvit denotes the variable part of the
total compensation, which includes bonus, the total value of restricted stock
granted, total value of stock options granted (using B-S formula), long-term in-
centive payouts, and all other total.
3. Relative compensation: In order to get an idea about the relationship between
xed and variable compensation, we build a variable called relative compensa-





4. Stock options granted relative to total compensation (optpcit): An indicator,
which measures more directly the strength of CEO incentives is the value of stock
19option grants per total compensation (salaryit+salayvit). If a CEO is exclusively
paid by options, then the measure takes a value of 1, whereas the absence of stock






where blk valueit is the value of stock option grants to the CEO.16
5. CEO ownership of rm (shrownpcit): Letting executives own part of the rm
is another way to align their interests with those of the owners. We measure CEO
rm ownership by the percentage of the company's shares owned by the CEO,
i.e.
shrownpcit =
shares owned by CEOit
total number of sharesit
 100 (29)
By taking these dierent measures of compensation, we are not only able to derive
the eect of competition on total compensation, but also to investigate how a chang-
ing degree of competition aects the structure of compensation (x versus variable
compensation, use of incentive schemes etc.)
As for a measure of the degree of competition (Comp), we shall employ two indi-
cators (see Section 3): the Boone-Weigand indicator and a latent variable indicator.17
In order to control for rm-specic characteristics, we further include sales (approx-
imating the size of the rm, see Baker and Hall (1998))18, the change in shareholder
16The value is calculated using the Black Scholes formula.
17As described in Section 3.2, we employ the rst principal component of the Matrix (BW-indicator,
Price-Cost-Margin). If a factor analysis is conducted instead of a principal component analysis (which
requires an estimate for the communalities), the dierence between the rst principal component and
the score of the factors is mainly in the level; the correlation between the two is very high, or even 1
if the communalities are estimated using the squared multiple correlations between the two variables
(which is a standard routine in STATA).
18For instance, the size of the rm might in
uence ownership concentration shrownpc. When a rm
grows, managers are likely to have a lower share due to wealth constraints and ecient risk bearing,
see Demsetz and Lehn (1985).
20value19 and uncertainty of the economic environment20. Since executive compensation
might be driven by the development of the stock market, we include the growth rate
of the Dow-Jones-Index (DJg) as a further control. Next to the control variables,
we include industry-xed eects as well as time-xed eects. However, we will later
check the robustness of the results if rm-specic xed eects are included instead of
industry-xed-eects.
Of course, our main interest lies on the coecient b, which describes the relationship
between the degree of competition in industry j and executive compensation of rms
i in industry j.
4.2 Model 2: Relationship between Competition, Outside Op-
tions Manager and Executive Compensation
Model 2 diers from Model 1 in that we include an interaction term Comp  OP
(CompetitionOutside Options) instead of Comp. The idea is to test the hypothe-
sis (see Section 2) that with good outside options of the managers, an increase in
competition is more likely to lead to an increase in incentives/compensation than with
bad outside options. We employ two measures for the outside options of the manger.
First, we think that the growth rate of the Dow Jones (denoted by DJg) might re
ect a
CEO's outside options reasonably well. The better the economy is going and the better
the expectations are about future growth, the easier it is for managers to nd another
(good) job and therefore, the higher the outside options generally are. Secondly, we
employ an indicator which is more tightly related to a CEO's past performance (de-
noted by BP (=bargaining power)). The following dummy variable is used for that
purpose: a value of 1 (strong bargaining power) is assigned, if the CEO's rm had an
average growth rate of shareholder return, which exceeded the industry's median over
the past three years; otherwise a value of zero is assigned (weak bargaining power).
19As is standard in the literature on the relationship between pay and performance, we measure
rm performance by the the change in shareholder value, which is dened as the return on equity
multiplied by the market value of equity in the previous period (see e.g. Jensen and Murphy, 1990).
20The uncertainty of the economic environment is measured by the standard deviation of the stock
price over the latest 60 months. It is the volatility gure which is used in calculating the Black-Scholes
values for options. The idea is that with higher uncertainty, it becomes more dicult to monitor the
management, and incentive alignments may be more likely achieved through high CEO ownership
than through cash compensation (see Demsetz and Lehn, 1985).
21Model 2 is given by equation (30):
Exeit = j+
t+bCompjt  OPit+cSalesit+dShareholderV alueit+eUncertit+fDJgt+it
(30)
Except from the interaction term, Model 2 employs the same variables as Model
1. We expect b to take a positive sign since an increase in competition is more likely
to result in higher compensation/incentives if the manager's outside options are good
rather than bad.21
5 Results
We estimate equations (26) and (30) using OLS. Although the intensity of competi-
tion might depend on on the way, executives are compensated, we do not think that
endogeneity poses a problem in our application. First of all, the four-rm concentra-
tion ratios in the considered industries are rather low (except for industry 336, see
www.census.gov). Therefore, strategic interaction between rms, where compensation
contracts are used to aect competition, is unlikely. Secondly, our regressions yield
very similar results when using the one-year lagged (and hence exogenous) competi-
tion indicator instead of the simultaneous one (see the Section with the robustness
tests).
5.1 Results for Model 1
Tables 1 and 2 depict the estimation results for industry 32. Whereas table 1 relies on
the BW-indicator as a measure of competition, table 2 uses the latent variable (LV)
approach. Since we look at ve sub-industries, we include 5 industry-xed eects next
to the time-xed eects (the year 1992 is dropped in order to avoid perfect collinearity).
As can be seen from table 1, an increase in competition led to a decrease in executive
compensation, in absolute terms (salary) as well as in incentives (variable salary, option
share). Therefore, for industry 32, we nd a negative relationship between competition
and the use of incentives.
21The competition indicator is constructed in a way which assigns higher values to more intense
competition, see Section 3.
22Table 2 conrms these ndings. Modelling competition as a latent variable doesn't
alter the previous result after which an increase in competition lead to a decrease in
compensation as well as the use of incentive schemes.
As for the control variables, they turn out to be mostly signicant and of the
expected sign. Compensation typically increases with the size of the rm, the growth in
shareholder return (\pay-for-performance"), the uncertainty of the rm's environment
and the growth of the Dow Jones Index. As can be seen from the last column tables
1 and 2, equities and options are used in a substitutive way.22 The more options are
given to the CEO, the less equities are needed for aligning the interests of the CEO
with those of the rm.









































































































Industry-FE￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿
Year-FE￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿
Adj.￿R
2  0.99￿ 0.96￿ 0.34￿ 0.71￿ 0.38￿
Number￿of￿








22We do not include the variable shrownpc in the estimation equation optpc because it would cause
a large drop in the available number of observations.



































































































-￿ -￿ -￿ -0.060
***￿
(0.016)￿
Industry-FE￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿
Year-FE￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿
Adj.￿R
2￿ 0.99￿ 0.96￿ 0.34￿ 0.71￿ 0.38￿
Number￿of￿








Tables 3 and 4 depict the relationship between competition and compensation for
industry 33. In contrast to industry 32, where more competition led to lower com-
pensation/incentive schemes, the opposite turns out to be true for industry 33. An
increase in competition led to an increase in variable compensation (salaryv), although
only signicantly in the latent variable approach.
At any rate, it is striking that the sign of the competition measure is exactly the
opposite in industries 32 and 33 for four out of ve compensation indicators. As such,
the theoretical models which predict ambiguous eects of competition on compensation
seem to be supported by the data.







































































































Industry-FE￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿
Year-FE￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿
Adj.￿R
2￿ 0.98￿ 0.96￿ 0.36￿ 0.69￿ 0.39￿
Number￿of￿












































































































-￿ -￿ -￿ -0.101
***￿
(0.018)￿
Industry-FE￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿
Year-FE￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿
Adj.￿R
2￿ 0.98￿ 0.96￿ 0.36￿ 0.69￿ 0.39￿
Number￿of￿









5.2 Robustness Tests for Model 1
Before drawing any denite conclusions, we would like to see how robust our results
are with respect to the chosen econometric specication as well as the timing between
changes in competition and executive compensation.
As for the rst, we re-estimate model 1 using rm-xed-eects instead of industry-
xed eects. Although inclusion of rm-xed eects makes sense from a conceptual
point of view, the estimation of 242 (industry 32) or 613 (industry 33) additional
parameters poses an econometric problem in terms of lost degrees of freedom as well
as small remaining variation in the competition indicator.23 Nevertheless, it seems
23In fact, inclusion of rm- and time-xed eects captures a large part of the variance of the
26important to check at least whether the signs remain the same as soon as rm-xed
eects are included instead of industry-xed eects.
Secondly, it might be the case that rm-owners do not immediately adapt executive
compensation to changes in competition, but rather with a lag. Therefore, we re-
estimate model 1 including the 1-year-lagged competition indicators instead of the
contemporaneous competition indicators.
As can be seen from tables 5 and 6, the results are fairly robust with respect to
these changes. Alternative specications mostly aect the signicance, but not the
sign of the estimated coecients.




















































































competition indicator. A simple regression of the BW-Indicator on rm- and time-xed eects shows
that 75 percent (industry 32) / 88 percent (industry 33) of the variance of the BW-Indicator can be
explained by these xed eects.

















































































Not reported for the sake of brevity is a last robustness check, which we conducted
for industry 32. Since the sub-industry 326 showed a very high number of the BW-
Indicator in the year 1993, we dropped this year as a further sensitivity check. As it
turns out, the estimated coecients do not change much if this particular data point
is dropped.
As such, our estimation results conrm the theoretical prediction, after which the
relationship between competition and incentives is ambiguous and depends on varying
countervailing eects. At least for the industries 32 and 33 of the manufacturing sector,
this relationship seems to be very dierent indeed.
5.3 Results for Model 2
Up so far, we focused on the relationship between competition and executive compen-
sation. Since the only testable hypothesis refers to the joint impact of competition and
outside options managers on executive compensation, we now turn to the estimation
28of model 2.
Precisely, Schmidt's (1997) model predicts that with increasing outside options
of the mangers, an increase in competition is more likely to lead to an increase in
incentives/compensation.







































































































Industry-FE￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿
Year-FE￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿
Adj.￿R
2￿ 0.99￿ 0.97￿ 0.34￿ 0.71￿ 0.38￿
Number￿of￿









Tables 7 and 8 depict the results for industry 32, using the BW-Indicator as a
competition measure. As can be seen therefrom, an increase in competition results in
higher compensation and stronger incentive payments, the better are the manager's
outside options. The most signicant results occur for the variable part of the salary.
The better the CEO's bargaining power (in terms of general favorable economic en-
vironment (DJg) or successful past performance (BP)), the more a CEO wants to be
29rewarded with a higher variable salary for the increase in competition.24








































































































Industry-FE￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿
Year-FE￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿
Adj.￿R
2￿ 0.99￿ 0.97￿ 0.34￿ 0.71￿ 0.66￿
Number￿of￿









Tables 9 and 10 replicate the estimations with the latent variable indicator instead
of the BW-Indicator. While there is again a positive impact on the variable salary, as
long as the growth rate of the Dow Jones Index is taken as a measure for the outside
options, the joint impact of competition and outside options becomes insignicant, if
the CEO's bargaining power is measured by past performance.
Overall, however, the picture remains that in industry 32, an increase in the bar-
gaining power of the CEO's positively aects the relationship between competition and
executive compensation.
24Note that the correlation between Comp(BWI)DJg and DJg is quite low (below 30 percent) and
therefore unlikely causing the positive signs.






































































































Industry-FE￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿
Year-FE￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿
Adj.￿R
2￿ 0.99￿ 0.96￿ 0.34￿ 0.71￿ 0.38￿
Number￿of￿







































































































-￿ -￿ -￿ -0.057
***￿
(0.016)￿
Industry-FE￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿
Year-FE￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿
Adj.￿R
2￿ 0.99￿ 0.97￿ 0.34￿ 0.71￿ 0.37￿
Number￿of￿









A similar picture arises for industry 33 (see tables 11 to 14). An increase in compe-
tition leads to a higher increase (or smaller decrease) in the variable part of the salary,
if the manager's outside options are high. Note further that the joint impact of com-
petition and outside options on the variable salary is signicant or highly signicant in
most of the specications.






































































































Industry-FE￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿
Year-FE￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿
Adj.￿R
2￿ 0.98￿ 0.96￿ 0.36￿ 0.69￿ 0.39￿
Number￿of￿

















































































































Industry-FE￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿
Year-FE￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿
Adj.￿R
2￿ 0.98￿ 0.96￿ 0.34￿ 0.69￿ 0.38￿
Number￿of￿















































































































Industry-FE￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿
Year-FE￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿
Adj.￿R
2￿ 0.98￿ 0.96￿ 0.35￿ 0.69￿ 0.39￿
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Industry-FE￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿
Year-FE￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿ Yes￿
Adj.￿R
2￿ 0.98￿ 0.96￿ 0.36￿ 0.69￿ 0.38￿
Number￿of￿









As for the robustness of model 2 with respect to using the lagged (joint) competition-
indicator, the results look similar.25 Only in industry 32, we observe a stronger positive
impact on the xed salary rather than the variable salary and a stronger positive impact
on the equity shares. Maybe, the variable part of the salary is easier changeable in the
short run, whereas re-negotiation of the xed salary requires more time.
Including rm-xed-eects instead of industry-xed-eects sometimes strengthens
the joint impact of competition and bargaining power on the xed salary and the equity
share, but lowers the eect on the variable salary. Again, with the exception of the
option-share in table 10,26 signicant coecients are always positive and mostly aect
the x and variable part of the salary as well as the equity shares.
25The robustness tests are omitted for the sake of brevity, but are available on request.
26The negative coecient remains signicant even with rm-xed eects.
36Therefore, for industry 32 as well as industry 33, we nd results which are consistent
with Schmidt's (1997) model. In fact, the bargaining power of the manager seems to be
a crucial determinant of how an increase in competition aects executive compensation.
Concerning the dierent components of executive compensation, it turns out that CEOs
with a strong bargaining power particularly aim at increasing the variable salary, as
soon as competition becomes more intense.
6 Conclusions
The discussion about whether competition fosters the use of incentive schemes for
executives or not has been mainly theoretical so far. If there is anything like a consensus
in the literature, then it is the cognition that the relationship between competition and
executive compensation is ambiguous and depends on varying, countervailing eects.
The goal of this paper was to add empirical evidence to the theoretical debate. Al-
though the desirability of empirical research was already mentioned in Schmidt (1997),
the relationship between changing competition and executive compensation has not
yet been explored with real data.
Focusing on rms in US manufacturing industries (NAICS 32-33) over the years
1992 to 2000, we discovered interesting eects of competition on executive compen-
sation. For instance, in industry 32, an increase in competition led to a lower level
of executive compensation (x as well as variable) and to the use of weaker incen-
tive schemes (lower share of variable compensation, less option and equity shares). In
contrast, exactly the opposite was observed in industry 33.
The nding that competition aects executive compensation dierently in dier-
ent industries may be explained with the theoretical claim that countervailing eects
persist. Also consistent with the literature (particularly Schmidt (1997)) is the result
that outside options of the manager matter for the relationship better competition and
executive compensation. During times where the economy was booming and managers
had good outside options, an increase in competition aected the level of compensa-
tion and the use of incentive schemes more positively than in a recession, where the
managers had no bargaining power.
Even though the results are quite robust with respect to dierent specications and
37dierent measures of competition, it is too early to draw denite conclusions. Since this
is the rst empirical study, more research in this area is clearly warranted. Especially
applying the same type of analysis to other industries than the manufacturing industry
seems to be a promising approach.
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8 Appendix
8.1 The empirical implementation of the Boone-Weigand in-
dicator
The Boone-Weigand indicator outlined in section 3 requires data on economic prots
and marginal costs, which are both not directly observable. Economic prots can
be approximated by accounting prots. The main dierence between economic and
accounting prot is that the former are based on market values and take into account
the opportunity costs of all factors of production in a forward looking way, while
accounting prots are based on historical book values.
Marginal costs can be approximated by the average variable costs under the as-
sumption of constant returns to scale.27 This approximation may cause problems, for
instance, when the quality of a product is important and cannot be observed. As a
consequence, the relevant market should be dened at the lowest possible disaggrega-
tion level, i.e., the goods should be not too heterogenous. Another problem is when the
rms within an industry do not meet the same condition. This is the case, for instance,
when there is an import tax on products of a foreign rm, whereas the domestic rm's
products are not taxed. If this tax cannot be observed, the domestic rms appears
relatively more ecient. To the extent that these measurement problems with respect
to marginal costs and uneven conditions stay constant over time within an industry,
changes in the relative prots indicator over time can be interpreted as changes in
competition in this industry.
27An alternative is to specify a total cost function and take the rst derivative. See, e.g., Hall
(1988).
39Finally, note that the computation of this competition measure does not require
the observation of all the rms in the industry since we can replace the values of the
most ecient rms by the industry median of prots and marginal costs.
Once we accept these approximation measures, we need rm-specic data on turnover,
expenses for direct labor (payroll) and materials to compute the regression variables
as follows:28
profitit = turnoverit   payrollit   expenses for materialsit (31)
av var costit =
(payrollit + expenses for materialsit)
salesit
(32)
We then compute the relative prots rel profitit and the relative costs, which we
denote by relative eciency rel effit, by normalizing the rm specic prots and








median av var costjt
(34)
For each 3-digit industry in our sample we estimate the following equation:






0 + clogsalesit + uit (35)
t is a time-specic intercept, with
t = 1 for year t = 1992;:::;2000 (36)
t = 0 for year t
0
= 1992;:::;2000;t 6= t
0
28In order to measure marginal costs more precisely, other costs such as expenses for debt service,
taxes, depreciation, advertising, and administration may be included.
40To obtain year-specic coecients of the competition measure b; we interact the relative
eciency variable with a time dummy Dt
0T; which is dened like the time specic
intercept, i.e.,
Dt
0T = 1 for year t = 1992;:::;2000 (37)
Dt
0T = 0 for year t
0
= 1992;:::;2000;t 6= t
0
We include sales as a control variable. The log specication controls for the skewness
of the distribution. Finally, uit is the remainder disturbance, with uit  IID(0;2
u)
independent of each other and among themselves.
We estimate (35) for each of the NAICS industries at the 3-digit level from the
NAICS industries 32 and 33 for which there are at least 30 observations.
The NAICS industry 32 has the following seven sub-industries (see Appendix 8.2):
321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327. For the ve sub-industries 322, 324, 325, 326 and 327
we have enough data, i.e., more than 30 observations, for estimating the BW-Indicator.
For the NAICS industry 33, there are eight sub-industries at the three-digit level: 331,
332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 339. Enough observations are available for estimating the
BW-Index for ve sub-industries, namely the industries 333, 334, 335, 336 and 339.
418.2 NAICS industries
NAICS 2-digit NAICS 3-digit industry description
32 321 Wood Product Manufacturing
322 Paper Manufacturing
323 Printing and Related Support Activities
324 Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing
325 Chemical Manufacturing
326 Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing
327 Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing
33 331 Primary Metal Manufacturing
332 Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing
333 Machinery Manufacturing
334 Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing
335 Electrical Equipment, Appliance
and Component Manufacturing
336 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing
337 Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing
339 Miscellaneous Manufacturing
42